On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcomes in plurality games (Q5931926)

From MaRDI portal
Revision as of 00:33, 30 January 2024 by Import240129110155 (talk | contribs) (Added link to MaRDI item.)
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1594693
Language Label Description Also known as
English
On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcomes in plurality games
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1594693

    Statements

    On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcomes in plurality games (English)
    0 references
    25 September 2001
    0 references
    The abstract model of a one-stage voting procedure introduced in \textit{R. B. Myerson} and \textit{R. J. Weber} [A theory of voting equilibria, Am. Political Sci. Rev. 87, 102-114 (1993)] is generalised. An analogy of \textit{J. C. Harsanyi}'s results [Int. J. Game Theory 2, 235-250 (1973; Zbl 0274.90085)] for generic (noncooperative) voting games under plurality rule the set of equilibria that induce a mixed distribution over the outcomes is finite and, furthermore, each of these equilibria is regular. From that the finiteness of the set of equilibrium distributions over outcomes is deduced.
    0 references
    generic voting games
    0 references
    noncooperative game
    0 references
    plurality game
    0 references

    Identifiers