Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes (Q2315452)

This book discusses voting paradoxes of elections with three candidates, estimating the probabilities of each being observed when several voting rules are applied. The voting rules are compared under theoretical situations that are expected to produce exaggerated estimates of these probabilities and by means of Monte Carlo simulations designed using the Tideman-Plassmann model with the basic probabilities extracted from the outcomes of actual elections collected by the Electoral Reform Society and from data bases of surveys of the American National Election Studies and of the Politbarometer. Dependence and homogeneity conditions under which these probabilities are reduced are discussed. Evaluating efficiency by the probability of confirming the Condorcet Winer, Borda rule consistently dominates the other rules considered, especially the other weighted score rules in single stage elections. It is shown that, generally, or the set where the different winners are elected by the different rules has a small probability or Borda rules presents the highest probability of confirming the Condorcet winner. Cases of more than three candidates are considered, where evidence favoring Borda rule is also found. The impact of factors like absenteeism or individuals or coalitions trying to manipulate the votes are also studied.