Some naturalistic reflections on set theoretic method (Q5950499)

The stated purpose of this paper is ``to illuminate, from a naturalistic point of view, the significance of the application of mathematics in the natural sciences for the practice of contemporary set theory''. The author is opposed to viewing the acceptability of new set-theoretic axioms either on the basis of a Platonist picture of an objective world of sets or in terms of what she calls `sociological explanations'. Rather, she emphasizes the importance of the goals of the relevant mathematical community. (Perhaps she does not give sufficient attention to the possibility that those goals will turn out to be wrong-headed.) As far as applicability is concerned, the historical examples cited in this paper point up the danger of letting immediate applications guide research. A more thorough treatment of these matters may be found in the author's book: Naturalism in mathematics, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1997; Zbl 0931.03003).