Average monotonic cooperative games (Q5954063)

This paper introduces a new class of transferable utility games. The authors define the concept of average monotonic game and analyze some well-known classes of games to determine whether or not they are average monotonic. The main result reported in this paper is that for any average monotonic cooperative game, the core coincides with both the bargaining set \(\grave{a}\) \(la\) Davis and Maschler and the bargaining set \(\grave{a}\) \(la\) Mas-Colell. To prove this result a technique based on reduced games is used. In this connection see also the articles by \textit{A. Mas-Colell} [J. Math. Econ. 18, 129-139 (1989; Zbl 0676.90011)] and \textit{L. Zhou} [Games Econ. Behav. 7, 295-300 (1994; Zbl 0809.90138)].