Privatization, price regulation, and market entry. An asymmetric multistage duopoly model (Q914533)

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Privatization, price regulation, and market entry. An asymmetric multistage duopoly model
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    Privatization, price regulation, and market entry. An asymmetric multistage duopoly model (English)
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    1990
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    A privatized firm, which inherited a high capacity from its public past, faces a potential entrant. The paper deals with the subgame perfect equilibria of a four-stage game with perfect foresight in which the firms first set their capacity and then prices, both sequentially. A further section analyzes the implications of a price-cap regulation which is imposed on the privatized incumbent. It is shown, inter alia, that a binding price constraint does not necessarily lead to an increase in capacity and output.
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    privatization
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    regulation
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    subgame perfect equilibria
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    four-stage game
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    perfect foresight
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