The hybrid solutions of an \(n\)-person game (Q1187870)

For an \(n\)-person game in strategic form, we introduce the concept of hybrid solution. For a given coalitional structure or a partition of players, the associated hybrid solution of the game is one in which different coalitions behave in a non-cooperative fashion, but within each coalition the players cooperate among themselves. The hybrid solution becomes the ordinary Nash equilibrium when the partition is finest (all coalitions are singletons), and becomes the alpha core when the partition consists of only one coalition: the grand coalition or the set of all players. Our main theorem is that the set of hybrid solutions for a given coalition is not empty if each player's strategy set is a compact convex set, and if each player's payoff function is continuous in the strategies of all players and quasi-concave in the strategies of those players belonging to his coalition. This becomes the Nash theorem when the partition is finest, and it becomes the Scarf theorem when the partition is coarsest.