Environmental policy instruments in an international duopoly with feedback investment strategies.

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(99)00076-7zbMath1056.91541OpenAlexW2162711426WikidataQ62381860 ScholiaQ62381860MaRDI QIDQ5958104

Aart J. De Zeeuw, Peter M. Kort, Thijs E. Feenstra

Publication date: 3 March 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(99)00076-7

zbMATH Keywords

differential gamecapital stockpolluting inputtaxes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (7)

DYNAMICALLY CONSISTENT SOLUTION FOR A POLLUTION MANAGEMENT GAME IN COLLABORATIVE ABATEMENT WITH UNCERTAIN FUTURE PAYOFFS ⋮ Environmental regulation, technological diversity, and the dynamics of technological change ⋮ Dynamically consistent collaborative environmental management with production technique choices ⋮ Dynamically consistent cooperative solution in a differential game of transboundary industrial pollution ⋮ On coincidence of feedback and global Stackelberg equilibria in a class of differential games ⋮ Markov interactions in a class of dynamic games ⋮ Capital-accumulation games under environmental regulation and duopolistic competition

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Equilibrium pollution taxes in open economies with imperfect competition
• Capital accumulation of a firm facing an emissions tax
• Capacity Investment, Preemption and Commitment in an Infinite Horizon Model
• Industry Structure and Cost-Reducing Investment

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