State- and control-dependent incentives in a closed-loop supply chain with dynamic returns
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Publication:291199
DOI10.1007/s13235-015-0142-6zbMath1348.90080OpenAlexW2037158223MaRDI QIDQ291199
Publication date: 7 June 2016
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0142-6
coordinationfeedback strategiesclosed-loop supply chaincontrol-dependent incentivestate-dependent incentive
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Dynamic games (91A25)
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Cites Work
- Intertemporal contracting in a supply chain
- Overcoming the drawbacks of a revenue-sharing contract through a support program
- A two-period game of a closed-loop supply chain
- Cost–Revenue Sharing in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain
- Shared-Savings Contracts for Indirect Materials in Supply Chains: Channel Profits and Environmental Impacts
- Closed-Loop Supply Chain Models with Product Remanufacturing
- Reverse Channel Design: The Case of Competing Retailers
- The Economics of Remanufacturing Under Limited Component Durability and Finite Product Life Cycles
- OR FORUM—The Evolution of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Research
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