A primal condition for approachability with partial monitoring

DOI10.3934/jdg.2014.1.447zbMath1314.91028arXiv1305.5399OpenAlexW2963096149MaRDI QIDQ482547

Shie Mannor, Gilles Stoltz, Vianney Perchet

Publication date: 5 January 2015

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1305.5399

zbMATH Keywords

online learningsignalsimperfect monitoringapproachability theorypartial monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Approachability of convex sets in games with partial monitoring
• An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
• Optimal strategies in repeated games with incomplete information
• Strategies for Prediction Under Imperfect Monitoring
• Internal Regret with Partial Monitoring. Calibration-Based Optimal Algorithms
• A first course on zero-sum repeated games

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