Procedural semantics for hyperintensional logic. Foundations and applications of transparent intensional logic (Q967450)

This hefty volume is a compendium of the fundamental concepts, techniques and applications of Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL), which originated with \textit{Pavel Tichý} (see, e.g., [The foundations of Frege's logic. Foundations of Communication/Library Edition. Berlin etc.: Walter de Gruyter (1988; Zbl 0671.03001)]). TIL is a hyperintensional logic in the sense that it draws finer-grained distinctions of meaning than intensions, construed in terms of functions on possible worlds. The central idea is that of `construction', something like a Fregean mode of presentation, except here rigorously defined. Constructions are procedures that instruct a language user to determine semantic values, objects, properties, truth values, etc. Hence the title of this work. TIL is an intensional logic in the sense that it freely presumes a full ontology of intensional entities. It is transparent in the sense that its language is fully extensional, committed to Leibniz's Law for unrestricted substitution for semantically equivalent terms. The underlying logic of TIL is a ramified typed lambda calculus, including partial functions. It differs from Church's logic of functions in that functional abstraction and application denote not functions and values, but rather multi-step structures specifying how to form functions and their values (if any), in short, constructions. TIL proposes a formal semantics, or logical analysis, for natural language. It is designed within certain broad philosophical perspectives. As a theory it is entirely a priori, eschewing all concern for empirically given aspects of language, including pragmatics. It is highly Platonistic, embracing not only a commitment to a realm of possible worlds, but also to an infinite hierarchy of higher-order entities. It is anti-actualist, in that it accords no privileged status in analysis to the actual world. It is, however, anti-possibilist in that it denies nonactual possibilia. It is anti-essentialist with regard to empirical properties of individuals, but avows an intensional essentialism, a priori relations between intensions. As a theory of language it is committed to a strong principle of compositionality, that the meaning of an expression is derived from the meanings of its subexpressions as the expression is syntactically derived from its subexpressions. It also subscribes to what the authors call the Parmenides Principle, that if an expression is about something then it contains a subexpression denoting that something, and conversely. Although much of the theory is inspired by Frege, it pointedly rejects Frege's notorious reference-shift to account for the logical behavior of oblique contexts. Instead of Frege's sense and denotation, TIL would have expressions that express a meaning, a construction, and denote an intension. Then much of the work of Frege's shift is accomplished by the \textit{de dicto}/\textit{de re} dichotomy. In this framework, ordinary proper names and definite descriptions never denote ordinary individuals, but only intensions, so-called `offices', which may or may not be filled by individuals and by different individuals in different possible worlds and at different times. Similarly for higher-order expressions. The book contains five long chapters. Chapter 1 presents motivating material and introduces the fundamental concepts of TIL, often by drawing contrasts with other theories, such as Montague's Intensional Logic. Chapter 2 applies those concepts to the foundations of semantic analysis itself, including a detailed account of tenses. Chapters 3--5 apply the framework to some standard, far-reaching problems in the philosophy of language. Chapter 3 addresses problems concerning singular terms, proper names and definite descriptions, as well as indexicals, with an extended discussion of anaphora within sentential contexts. Chapter 4 takes on various questions regarding necessity and the essences of things. These are explicated in terms of a fundamental relation of `requisite' that may obtain between properties. Individuals themselves are bare of all (non-trivial) essences. Chapter 5 develops the theory of propositional attitudes, and other notional concepts; it is these especially that call for a hyperintensional framework. Throughout, there is a sharp division drawn between the language of empirical concepts and mathematical language. The two are presented in tandem, and similar problems may arise for each, but the details of their analyses are different. Everywhere one might question many of the interpretations in the examples given (e.g., that `whales are mammals' is analytic, p.~17 \textit{et passim}), but the examples are only for illustration, and the reader could supply others that might suit better. Many parts of natural language are not discussed. For example, there is no account of connectors like `and', `but', `or', `if', `when', `not', etc. When they appear in examples they are simply treated as the familiar logical connectives even though they do not behave that way in any vernacular language. Nor are quantifiers, e.g., `many', `most', considered in general. There is no discussion of adverbs. Despite all the attention to philosophical issues about necessity, there is no discussion of modalities, `necessarily', `possibly', `must', `could', etc., as they occur in natural languages. Nor is there any discussion of normative expressions, `ought', `may', `should', etc. Nor of imperative sentences, though interrogatives are briefly considered. Quotation, whether direct or indirect, is not discussed. TIL is, however, rich with resources, and could perhaps find room for all of these. On a more philosophical front, the several semantic paradoxes receive no attention. Nor do issues of vagueness.