The time inconsistency of delegation-based time inconsistency solutions in monetary policy

DOI10.1007/s10957-011-9847-xzbMath1233.91190OpenAlexW2052449767MaRDI QIDQ650215

Florin O. Bilbiie

Publication date: 25 November 2011

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-011-9847-x

zbMATH Keywords

monetary policycommitmentoptimal delegationtime-inconsistencycentral bankinginflation contracts and targets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (1)

Delegating optimal monetary policy inertia

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Some thoughts on rational expectations models, and alternate formulations
• EXPECTATIONS, CREDIBILITY, AND TIME-CONSISTENT MONETARY POLICY
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly

This page was built for publication: The time inconsistency of delegation-based time inconsistency solutions in monetary policy