Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90023-DzbMath0714.90008MaRDI QIDQ751456

Tim Worrall, Jonathan P. Thomas

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

discounting; repeated principal-agent model; unobservable random income

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B16: Utility theory

90C39: Dynamic programming

91B62: Economic growth models

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games

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Cites Work

• Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing
• Asymptotic efficiency in principal-agent models with hidden information
• A law of large numbers in the theory of consumer's choice under uncertainty
• Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
• On the Differentiability of the Value Function in Dynamic Models of Economics
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