Dynamic Cournot-competitive harvesting of a common pool resource

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2003.04.003zbMath1200.91244OpenAlexW2118100132MaRDI QIDQ953681

Stein I. Steinshamn, Leif Kristoffer Sandal

Publication date: 6 November 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/166512

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot competitionnatural resource exploitationdynamic game-theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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