The impossibility of effective enforcement mechanisms in collateralized credit markets
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Publication:972376
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.12.004zbMath1280.91071MaRDI QIDQ972376
Thiago Revil T. Ferreira, Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez
Publication date: 25 May 2010
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.12.004
91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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On Ponzi schemes in infinite horizon collateralized economies with default penalties, Financial segmentation and collateralized debt in infinite-horizon economies, Recourse loans and Ponzi schemes, Equilibrium with limited-recourse collateralized loans, Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties
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