Uniformly bounded information and social choice

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2009.03.006zbMATH Open1167.91012OpenAlexW1994349421MaRDI QIDQ1030168FDOQ1030168

Jerry S. Kelly, Donald E. Campbell

Publication date: 1 July 2009

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://economics.wm.edu/wp/cwm_wp49.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

social welfare functioninfinite setchromatic graphs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Social choice (91B14) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Social choice and individual values
• Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills
• Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces?
• On the informational basis of social choice
• Arrow's theorem with a fixed feasible alternative
• Irrelevant Alternatives and Social Welfare

Cited In (1)

• Information-theoretic bounded rationality and \(\epsilon\)-optimality

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