Finite \(N\)-person non-cooperative games with unique equilibrium points

DOI10.1007/BF01755957zbMath0479.90090OpenAlexW2051200159MaRDI QIDQ1161689

Victoria L. Kreps

Publication date: 1981

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01755957

zbMATH Keywords

unique equilibriumcompletely mixed strategy \(N\)-tuplefinite \(N\)-person noncooperative game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (8)

Constructing bimatrix games with unique equilibrium points ⋮ The maximal number of regular totally mixed Nash equilibria ⋮ Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium points in bimatrix games ⋮ Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining ⋮ In memory of Victoria Kreps (3 September 1945--3 March 2021) ⋮ On game-theoretic characterisation of stochastic independence ⋮ Equilibrium points in special n-person games ⋮ On Maximal Vector Spaces of Finite Noncooperative Games

Cites Work

• Bimatrix games with unique equilibrium points
• Structure of equilibria in N-person non-cooperative games

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