Single-peaked orders on a tree

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90020-8zbMath0495.90007MaRDI QIDQ1169916

Gabrielle Demange

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90020-8

zbMATH Keywords

transitivity; existence of a majority winner; sets of single-peaked linear orders on a tree; strict majority rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks, A characterization of the single-peaked domain, Tops-only domains, Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule, Strategy-proof location on a network, Condorcet winners for public goods, On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties, The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces, Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains, Recognizing single-peaked preferences on a tree, The structure of non-manipulable social choice rules on a tree, Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences, Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences, Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization

Cites Work

• The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences
• A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule
• The Simple Majority Decision Rule
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision