Delayed agreements and nonexpected utility
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Publication:1198175
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(91)90013-5zbMath0753.90017OpenAlexW2086618342WikidataQ57928810 ScholiaQ57928810MaRDI QIDQ1198175
Chaim Fershtman, Zvi Safra, Daniel R. Vincent
Publication date: 16 January 1993
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/867.pdf
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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