An admissible set occurring in various bargaining situations

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(77)90139-9zbMath0364.90146MaRDI QIDQ1241194

David Schmeidler, Ehud Kalai

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/191.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A12: Cooperative games

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

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Cites Work

• A stochastic bargaining process for \(n\)-person games
• Collective Choice Correspondences as Admissible Outcomes of Social Bargaining Processes
• The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Two-Person Cooperative Games