Extending Condorcet's rule

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(77)90012-6zbMath0399.90006MaRDI QIDQ1254926

H. Peyton Young

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(77)90012-6

zbMATH Keywords

Choice Problems; Majority Alternative; Patern Recognition Problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

68T10: Pattern recognition, speech recognition

91B14: Social choice

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Control of Condorcet voting: complexity and a relation-algebraic approach, The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering sets, Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules, Distance rationalization of voting rules, A theory of coalition formation in committees, The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist., Welfare maximization entices participation, On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections, Parameterized computational complexity of Dodgson and Young elections, Condorcet consistency and the strong no show paradoxes, On stable rules for selecting committees, A partial taxonomy of judgment aggregation rules and their properties, Rationalizations of Condorcet-consistent rules via distances of Hamming type, Are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby?, Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting, Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control, Parameterized Computational Complexity of Dodgson and Young Elections

Cites Work

• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
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