The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
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Publication:1581188
DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2639zbMath0998.91017MaRDI QIDQ1581188
Publication date: 24 November 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2639
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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