Games for cautious players: the equilibrium in secure strategies
Publication:1651225
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.03.011zbMath1400.91008OpenAlexW2596110108MaRDI QIDQ1651225
Alexey Iskakov, Mikhail Iskakov, Claude d'Aspremont
Publication date: 12 July 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://alfresco.uclouvain.be/alfresco/service/guest/streamDownload/workspace/SpacesStore/bcde1a50-e3ef-4bba-8a4c-4933ff4c3746/coredp2016_51web.pdf?guest=true
noncooperative gamesequilibrium existenceHotelling modelBertrand-Edgeworth duopolyTullock contestinsurance marketequilibrium in secure strategies
Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Spatial models in economics (91B72)
Related Items (4)
Cites Work
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