Principals and agents: does the assignment of information matter?

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Publication:1676740

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DOI10.1016/0165-1765(90)90005-LzbMath1375.91143OpenAlexW1577947897MaRDI QIDQ1676740

Julianne Nelson

Publication date: 9 November 2017

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90005-l

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information

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