Flow auctions

DOI10.1007/s00182-016-0549-3zbMath1415.91143OpenAlexW3192670739MaRDI QIDQ1677243

Zvi Wiener, Eyal Winter, Ilan Kremer

Publication date: 10 November 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/126926/1/FlowAuctions.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

dynamicsNash equilibriumauctionscollusioncontracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
• Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

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