Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox (Q1106064)

There are voting methods where it is better for a voter not to vote than to cast a sincere ballot. \textit{S. J. Brams} and \textit{P. C. Fishburn} [Math. Mag. 56, 207-214 (1983; Zbl 0521.90006)] have described voting procedures where the ``no show paradox'' arises. The author shows in the present paper that this paradox can also occur in Condorcet consistent voting rules. Let A denote a finite set of candidates and let N be the set of potential voters. Any finite N' of N is called an electorate. Each voter is assumed to possess a linear ordering \(u_ i\) on A. L(A) is the set of all such orderings. Given N', a profile \(u\in L(A)^{N'}\) assigns a linear ordering to each voter \(i\in N'\). A voting rule is a mappig S associating with every N'\(\subset N\) and profile \(u\in L(A)^{N'}\), a candidate S(N',u)\(\in A\). A voting procedure is Condorcet consistent if it elects the Condorcet winner whenever there is one: Condorcet Consistency. For all N'\(\subset N\), all \(u\in L(A)^{N'}\), all \(a\in A\), \(\{n_{ab}>0\) for all \(b\neq a\}\Rightarrow\) \(S(N',u)=a\), where \(n_{ab}(N',u)=| \{i\in N':\) \(u_ i(a)>u_ i(b)\}| -| \{i\in N':\) \(u_ i(b)>u_ i(a)\}|\) for all \(a,b\in A\), \(N'\subset N\), \(u\in L(A)^{N'}.\) We say that the voting rule S never generates the no show paradox if it satisfies the Participation property: Participation. For all \(N' \subset N\), \(| N'| \leq 2\), all \(u \in L(A)^{N'}\), and \(i \in N'\), \(u_ i(S(N'\setminus \{i\}, u_{-i})) \leq u_ i(S(N',u))\). Moulin's result is the following Theorem: (i) If A contains 3 candidates or less, there are voting rules satisfying Participation and Condorcet consistency. (ii) If A contains 4 candidates or more, and N contains at least 25 voters, there is no voting rule satisfying Participation and Condorcet consistency. \textit{H. P. Young} [Econometrica 42, 1129-1131 (1974; Zbl 0297.90003)] has observed that all Condorcet consistent voting rules violate the reinforcement axiom, requiring that when two disjoint electorates agree on the elected candidate, this candidate will be chosen by the combined electorate. Reinforcement and participation are logically independent. Moulin gives examples of voting rules which satisfy one property and violate the other. Scoring methods are voting rules which satisfy both participation and reinforcement.