An application of the theory of social situations to repeated games
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Publication:1825153
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90082-3zbMath0683.90107MaRDI QIDQ1825153
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90082-3
discounting; infinitely repeated games; social situations; nondiscriminating stationary stable standard; perfect equilibrium paths
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
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Coalitions, leadership, and social norms: The power of suggestion in games, Stable agreements in infinitely repeated games, Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability, Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency, Conservative stable standards of behavior and \(\varphi\)-stable sets
Cites Work