A nonstandard approach to the logical omniscience problem
Publication:5917442
DOI10.1016/0004-3702(94)00060-3zbMath1014.03513OpenAlexW2159217391WikidataQ126323793 ScholiaQ126323793MaRDI QIDQ5917442
Moshe Y. Vardi, Ronald Fagin, Joseph Y. Halpern
Publication date: 4 February 2003
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(94)00060-3
possible worldsepistemic logiclogical omnisciencelogic of implicit and explicit beliefnonstandard propositional logic
Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45) Other nonclassical logic (03B60) Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)
Related Items (19)
Cites Work
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