A dynamic solution to the problem of logical omniscience
DOI10.1007/S10992-018-9473-2zbMATH Open1457.03008OpenAlexW2884822640WikidataQ129483620 ScholiaQ129483620MaRDI QIDQ2000671FDOQ2000671
Jens Christian Bjerring, Mattias Skipper
Publication date: 28 June 2019
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-018-9473-2
bounded rationalityepistemic logicdoxastic logiclogical omniscienceimpossible worldsresource-bounded reasoning
Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)
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Cited In (13)
- An algorithmic impossible-worlds model of belief and knowledge
- The logic of fast and slow thinking
- A probabilistic semantics for belief logic
- A modal view on resource-bounded propositional logics
- \(Log_A\mathbf{G}\): an algebraic non-monotonic logic for reasoning with graded propositions
- The fundamental problem of logical omniscience
- Hyperintensional semantics: a Fregean approach
- A Logic of Knowledge and Belief Based on Abstract Arguments
- The logic of hyperlogic. Part B: Extensions and restrictions
- Bayesianism for non-ideal agents
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- The effort of reasoning: modelling the inference steps of boundedly rational agents
- THE LOGIC OF HYPERLOGIC. PART A: FOUNDATIONS
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