Impossible worlds and the logic of imagination

DOI10.1007/s10670-017-9875-5zbMath1417.03044OpenAlexW2582193372WikidataQ59481314 ScholiaQ59481314MaRDI QIDQ1707216

Francesco Berto

Publication date: 29 March 2018

Published in: Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9875-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Related Items (14)

Perception, memory, and imagination as propositional attitudes ⋮ Williamson on counterpossibles ⋮ <scp>Stit</scp>-LOGIC FOR IMAGINATION EPISODES WITH VOLUNTARY INPUT ⋮ Logics of synonymy ⋮ Modal inferences in science: a tale of two epistemologies ⋮ Hyperintensional logics for everyone ⋮ Special issue of synthese on new directions in the epistemology of modality: introduction ⋮ Metaphysical and absolute possibility ⋮ Counterlogicals as counterconventionals ⋮ A dynamic solution to the problem of logical omniscience ⋮ Simple hyperintensional belief revision ⋮ Observations on the trivial world ⋮ Rethinking epistemic logic with belief bases ⋮ Axiomatizing the logic of imagination

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