The effort of reasoning: modelling the inference steps of boundedly rational agents
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6097771
Recommendations
- The effort of reasoning: modelling the inference steps of boundedly rational agents
- A dynamic epistemic logic for resource-bounded agents
- Developing bounded reasoning
- An epistemic model of an agent who does not reflect on reasoning processes
- Reasoning about Other Agents’ Beliefs under Bounded Resources
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3821682 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795568 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795590 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1442964 (Why is no real title available?)
- A catalog of Boolean concepts.
- A dynamic solution to the problem of logical omniscience
- A general possible worlds framework for reasoning about knowledge and belief
- A logic of situated resource-bounded agents
- A qualitative theory of dynamic interactive belief revision
- Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning
- Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Logical Omniscience
- Dynamic epistemic logic
- Dynamic logic for belief revision
- Handbook of epistemic logic
- Impossible possible worlds vindicated
- Learning by Questions and Answers: From Belief-Revision Cycles to Doxastic Fixed Points
- Logical dynamics of information and interaction
- Logics of communication and change
- Logics of public communications
- Modal logic
- Reasoning about knowledge and probability
- Reasoning about rational, but not logically omniscient, agents
- Resource bounded belief revision
- The effort of reasoning: modelling the inference steps of boundedly rational agents
Cited in
(7)- An algorithmic impossible-worlds model of belief and knowledge
- An epistemic model of an agent who does not reflect on reasoning processes
- Predictive theory of mind models based on public announcement logic
- A dynamic epistemic logic for resource-bounded agents
- Depth-bounded reasoning. Volume 1: classical propositional logic
- The effort of reasoning: modelling the inference steps of boundedly rational agents
- The logic of fast and slow thinking
This page was built for publication: The effort of reasoning: modelling the inference steps of boundedly rational agents
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6097771)