The absence of attrition in a war of attrition under complete information

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.004zbMath1483.91008arXiv2110.12013OpenAlexW3215156175MaRDI QIDQ2078041

H. Dharma Kwon, George Georgiadis, Young-Soo Kim

Publication date: 25 February 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.12013

zbMATH Keywords

mixed strategiescontinuous timewar of attrition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Related Items (2)

Strategic investment with positive externalities ⋮ Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers

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