First-mover advantage reversals under passive cross forward ownership in vertically related markets

DOI10.1007/s40505-022-00235-1zbMath1505.91233OpenAlexW4293731546MaRDI QIDQ2099327

Emmanuel Petrakis, Panagiotis Skartados

Publication date: 23 November 2022

Published in: Economic Theory Bulletin (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-022-00235-1

zbMATH Keywords

Stackelberg competitionvertical relationsfirst mover advantageinterim observable contractslinear tariffspassive cross forward ownership

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Price discrimination and sequential contracting in monopolistic input markets
• The non-existence of pairwise-proof equilibrium
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly
• Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with incomplete information
• Endogenous sequencing of firm decisions
• On the pro-competitive effects of passive partial backward ownership
• Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly
• First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
• The Welfare Effects of Vertical Integration in Multichannel Television Markets

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