Implementation of Jefferson-d'Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee

DOI10.1007/s00355-012-0718-7zbMath1293.91055OpenAlexW2062063299MaRDI QIDQ2247939

Joaquín Pérez, Omar De La Cruz

Publication date: 30 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0718-7

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcommitteesvotingd'Hondt ruleJefferson ruleparliament formationpolitical decision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Group preferences (91B10) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (2)

A disproportionality bias in the bureau of the regional assembly of Madrid ⋮ Alliance incentives under the D'Hondt method

Cites Work

• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
• Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
• A crash course in implementation theory

This page was built for publication: Implementation of Jefferson-d'Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee