Global environment and dynamic games of environmental policy in an international duopoly
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Publication:2272178
DOI10.1007/s00712-009-0068-9zbMath1167.91404OpenAlexW2166155636MaRDI QIDQ2272178
Publication date: 6 August 2009
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-009-0068-9
Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25)
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