Lorenz comparison between increasing serial and Shapley value cost-sharing rules

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2019.03.015zbMath1414.91254OpenAlexW2921854441MaRDI QIDQ2419899

Ngoc Anh Pham

Publication date: 4 June 2019

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.03.015

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueserial cost sharingcost-sharing problemLorenz comparison

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Allocation inequality in cost sharing problem

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Decreasing serial cost sharing: an axiomatic characterization
• Decreasing serial cost sharing under economies of scale
• Average cost pricing versus serial cost sharing: An axiomatic comparison
• Cost sharing under increasing returns: A comparison of simple mechanisms
• Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing
• Internal Telephone Billing Rates—A Novel Application of Non-Atomic Game Theory
• An Introduction to Allocation Rules
• Serial Cost Sharing
• Mixed serial cost sharing.

This page was built for publication: Lorenz comparison between increasing serial and Shapley value cost-sharing rules