Assent-maximizing social choice

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0614-6zbMath1287.91055OpenAlexW1971237844MaRDI QIDQ2452261

Katherine A. Baldiga, Jerry R. Green

Publication date: 2 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0614-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (11)

Representative democracy and the implementation of majority-preferred alternatives ⋮ A new interpretation and derivation of the Swaps index ⋮ Measuring polarization in preferences ⋮ A non-utilitarian discrete choice model for preference aggregation ⋮ Preference aggregation in the generalised unavailable candidate model ⋮ Increasing interdependence of multivariate distributions ⋮ Modeling value disagreement ⋮ Measuring the cohesiveness of preferences: an axiomatic analysis ⋮ Do we agree? Measuring the cohesiveness of preferences ⋮ Strategyproof and efficient preference aggregation with Kemeny-based criteria ⋮ Beyond pairwise comparisons in social choice: a setwise Kemeny aggregation problem

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• Voting, the Symmetric Group, and Representation Theory
• A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
• Lectures on Polytopes

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