The exact law of large numbers via Fubini extension and characterization of insurable risks

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Publication:2490122


DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.10.005zbMath1108.60025MaRDI QIDQ2490122

Yeneng Sun

Publication date: 28 April 2006

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.10.005


60F15: Strong limit theorems

28A35: Measures and integrals in product spaces


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