Game theory and human evolution: a critique of some recent interpretations of experimental games

DOI10.1016/j.tpb.2005.09.005zbMath1117.92046WikidataQ34491501 ScholiaQ34491501MaRDI QIDQ2500403

Peter Hammerstein, Edward H. Hagen

Publication date: 23 August 2006

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2005.09.005

zbMATH Keywords

Behavioral economics; Altruism; Ultimatum game; Strong reciprocity; Cultural group selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

92D15: Problems related to evolution

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

91D10: Models of societies, social and urban evolution

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Cites Work

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• The evolution of continuous variation. II: Complex transmission and assortative mating
• Models for cultural inheritance. I: Group mean and within group variation
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• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment