Staying together or breaking apart: policy-makers' endogenous coalitions formation in the European economic and monetary union
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Publication:2567173
DOI10.1016/j.cor.2004.06.015zbMath1116.91343DBLPjournals/cor/BartolomeoEPA06OpenAlexW2139742428WikidataQ57787184 ScholiaQ57787184MaRDI QIDQ2567173
Publication date: 29 September 2005
Published in: Computers \& Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/irua/1b7baf/1dc34807.pdf
Applications of game theory (91A80) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)
Related Items (2)
Developments in differential game theory and numerical methods: Economic and management applications ⋮ Models of Endogenous Coalition Formation Between Fiscal and Monetary Authorities in the Presence of a Monetary Union
Cites Work
- Two-country models of monetary and fiscal policy: What have we learned? What more can we learn?
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- The (in)finite horizon open-loop Nash LQ game: An application to EMU
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- Monetary and Fiscal policy design in the EMU: An overview
- Incentives to cooperate in linear quadratic difference games
- Cooperative and non-cooperative fiscal stabilization policies in the EMU.
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