Standard Security Does Not Imply Security against Selective-Opening

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_38zbMath1297.94046OpenAlexW2114010645MaRDI QIDQ2894436

Scott Yilek, Brent Waters, Mihir Bellare, Rafael Dowsley

Publication date: 29 June 2012

Published in: Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2012 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_38

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

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