Selective Opening Security from Simulatable Data Encapsulation

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-53890-6_9zbMath1407.94119OpenAlexW2557031410MaRDI QIDQ2953779

Felix Heuer, Bertram Poettering

Publication date: 6 January 2017

Published in: Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2016 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53890-6_9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Related Items (9)

SO-CCA secure PKE from pairing based all-but-many lossy trapdoor functions ⋮ Simulation-based selective opening security for receivers under chosen-ciphertext attacks ⋮ Selective Opening Security from Simulatable Data Encapsulation ⋮ Let attackers program ideal models: modularity and composability for adaptive compromise ⋮ Compact and tightly selective-opening secure public-key encryption schemes ⋮ Simulation-based bi-selective opening security for public key encryption ⋮ Possibility and impossibility results for receiver selective opening secure PKE in the multi-challenge setting ⋮ Receiver selective opening security for identity-based encryption in the multi-challenge setting ⋮ Practical public key encryption with selective opening security for receivers

Cites Work

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