Oligopoly Equilibria When Firms Have Local Knowledge of Demand

DOI10.2307/2526806zbMATH Open0689.90008OpenAlexW2093475920MaRDI QIDQ3032033FDOQ3032033

Giacomo Bonanno

Publication date: 1988

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2526806

zbMATH Keywords

local Nash equilibriumoligopoly gameslocal knowledge

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cited In (15)

• Complexity analysis of dual-channel game model with different managers' business objectives
• Learning cycles in Bertrand competition with differentiated commodities and competing learning rules
• A PRICE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS IN A MODEL OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
• Fallacies of composition in nonlinear marketing models
• Competition in multi-characteristics spaces: Hotelling was almost right
• Oligopoly games with nonlinear demand and cost functions: Two boundedly rational adjustment processes
• Cournot duopoly when the competitors operate multiple production plants
• The political economy of (de)centralization with complementary public goods
• Nonlinear duopoly games with positive cost externalities due to spillover effects.
• Limited knowledge of demand and oligopoly equilibria
• Generic regularity of differentiated product oligopolies
• Research on the Complexity of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Model in Competitive Retailing Service Market
• Anything goes with heterogeneous, but not always with homogeneous oligopoly
• Cournot-Walras and locally consistent equilibria
• Dynamics of a risk-averse newsvendor model with continuous-time delay in supply chain financing

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