Oligopoly Equilibria When Firms Have Local Knowledge of Demand (Q3032033)

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4130143
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    Oligopoly Equilibria When Firms Have Local Knowledge of Demand
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4130143

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      Oligopoly Equilibria When Firms Have Local Knowledge of Demand (English)
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      1988
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      oligopoly games
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      local knowledge
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      local Nash equilibrium
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      This paper considers oligopoly games where firms have only local knowledge of demand because they learn of demand through only small variations of price and stop when profits reach a local maximum. In the model, there are n firms, each having constant marginal cost of production. The demand function is assumed to be smooth and bounded. A local Nash equilibrium is a vector of prices for which there exists a neighborhood such that profits for each firm are maximized in this neighborhood, taking the prices charged by other firms as given. The paper shows that a local Nash equilibrium exists if the demand function is either concave or slightly convex. The paper also provides two examples which show that local Nash equilibria do not always exist and that there are games which do not have Nash equilibria but possess a finite number of local equilibria.
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