A Combinatorial Auction with Multiple Winners for Universal Service

DOI10.1287/MNSC.46.4.586.12054zbMath1231.91119OpenAlexW2118582661MaRDI QIDQ3116752

Richard Steinberg, F. P. Kelly

Publication date: 12 February 2012

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/5fe54faddcdceba1df14bbcf0492c7ba3782d86b

zbMATH Keywords

auctionscombinatorial bidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (9)

Emerging multiple issue e-auctions ⋮ Auctions with bidder-determined allowable combinations ⋮ Location-based techniques for the synergy approximation in combinatorial transportation auctions ⋮ Combinatorial auctions ⋮ A combinatorial auction improves school meals in Chile: a case of OR in developing countries ⋮ Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions ⋮ Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions ⋮ Exploring the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions: the threshold revenue and the threshold-price rule ⋮ BOB: Improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations

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