Truth in a Logic of Formal Inconsistency: How classical can it get?

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Publication:3386894

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DOI10.1093/jigpal/jzy059zbMath1477.03096OpenAlexW2914408765MaRDI QIDQ3386894

Lavinia Picollo

Publication date: 8 January 2021

Published in: Logic Journal of the IGPL (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10066276/

zbMATH Keywords

proof-theoretic strength Kripke fixed points LFIs sequent-calculus truth theories

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Proof theory in general (including proof-theoretic semantics) (03F03) Paraconsistent logics (03B53)

Related Items (4)

, , AND REINHARDT’S PROGRAM ⋮ THE POWER OF NAIVE TRUTH ⋮ Paraconsistent logic and query answering in inconsistent databases ⋮ Notes on models of (partial) Kripke-Feferman truth

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