Social choice and resource allocation: a topological perspective (Q1367914)
From MaRDI portal
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
---|---|---|---|
English | Social choice and resource allocation: a topological perspective |
scientific article |
Statements
Social choice and resource allocation: a topological perspective (English)
0 references
1997
0 references
Let \(P\) be the space of preferences on a finite-dimensional Euclidean space. This paper surveys work stemming from Chichilnisky's theorem: there is no social choice rule from \(P^k\) to \(P\) which is continuous, anonymous, and respects unanimity. This theorem has striking implications, as the following equivalences show: ``Arrow's Theorem'' iff ``Chichilnisky's Theorem'' iff ``Core equivalence with competitive equilibrium''. The 39 papers surveyed derive these equivalences, and consider extensions of them to infinite \(k\).
0 references
continuous social choice
0 references
Arrow's theorem
0 references
Chichilnisky's theorem
0 references
core equivalence
0 references
continuous
0 references
anonymous
0 references
unanimity
0 references