The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
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Publication:3686381
DOI10.2307/1912658zbMath0569.90008MaRDI QIDQ3686381
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912658
lattice; core; manipulability; matching markets; assignment games; two-sided markets; general demand structure; set of equilibrium prices
91A12: Cooperative games
91A80: Applications of game theory
91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)
91B50: General equilibrium theory
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