Spatial Oligopolistic Electricity Models with Cournot Generators and Regulated Transmission Prices

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Publication:4545695

DOI10.1287/opre.47.1.102zbMath1175.91080OpenAlexW2134809310MaRDI QIDQ4545695

Yves Smeers, Jingyuan Wei

Publication date: 30 October 2002

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.47.1.102




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