On Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Symmetric Submodular Objectives

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_1zbMath1405.91221arXiv1704.06901OpenAlexW2610076149MaRDI QIDQ4614052

Georgios Amanatidis, Evangelos Markakis, Georgios Birmpas

Publication date: 30 January 2019

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.06901

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designbudget constraintprocurement auctionsmonotone submodular valuations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04)

Related Items (5)

Budget-feasible mechanisms for proportionally selecting agents from groups ⋮ Simple and efficient budget feasible mechanisms for monotone submodular valuations ⋮ A simple deterministic algorithm for symmetric submodular maximization subject to a knapsack constraint ⋮ Budget feasible mechanisms on matroids ⋮ Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online

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