Computing optimal incentives via bilevel programming

DOI10.1080/02331939508844061zbMath0821.90149MaRDI QIDQ4836754

Stephan Dempe

Publication date: 21 June 1995

Published in: Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/02331939508844061

zbMATH Keywords

bilevel programming; principal-agency theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A65: Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games)

90C31: Sensitivity, stability, parametric optimization

Related Items

Quasidifferntiability of optimal solutions in parametric optimal solutions in parametric nonlinear optimization, Sample average approximation for the continuous type principal-agent problem, Solving nonlinear principal-agent problems using bilevel programming, Bilevel convex programming models

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